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IRS-based Wireless Jamming Attacks:
When Jammers can Attack without Power
Bin Lyu, Dinh Thai Hoang, Shimin Gong, Dusit Niyato, and Dong In Kim
Abstract
This paper proposes to use Intelligent Reflecting Surface (IRS) as a green jammer to attack a legitimate
communication without using any internal energy to generate jamming signals. In particular, the IRS is used to
intelligently reflect the signals from the legitimate transmitter to the legitimate receiver (LR) to guarantee that the
received signals from direct and reflecting links can be added destructively, which thus diminishes the Signal-to-
Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) at the LR. To minimize the received signal power at the LR, we consider the
joint optimization of magnitudes of reflection coefficients and discrete phase shifts at the IRS. Based on the block
coordinate descent, semidefinite relaxation, and Gaussian randomization techniques, the solution can be obtained
efficiently. Through simulation results, we show that by using the IRS-based jammer, we can reduce the signal
power received at the LR by up to 99%. Interestingly, the performance of the proposed IRS-based jammer is even
better than that of the conventional active jamming attacks in some scenarios.
Index Terms
Jamming attack, IRS, intelligent backscatter, IoT, low-power sensor networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) has been emerging to be a breakthrough technology
which enables significantly improving spectrum and energy efficiency for future wireless communication
systems [1]-[3]. Unlike the conventional backscattering communication techniques which uncontrollably
scatter reflected radio frequency (RF) signals [4], the IRS provides a smart radio environment in which
B. Lyu is with Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, China (e-mail: blyu@njupt.edu.cn).
D. T. Hoang is with University of Technology Sydney, Australia (email:hoang.dinh@uts.edu.au).
S. Gong is with Sun Yat-sen University, China (email: gong0012@e.ntu.edu.sg).
D. Niyato is with Nanyang Technological University, Singapore (email: dniyato@ntu.edu.sg)
D. I. Kim is with Sungkyunkwan University, South Korea (e-mail: dikim@skku.ac.kr)
2the reflected signals will be controlled in order to remarkably enhance the network performance [5]. In
particular, IRS is a reconfigurable metasurface composed of multiple low-cost passive reflecting elements.
Each element can reflect the incident signal independently with an adjustable amplitude and phase
shift controlled by an IRS micro-controller (as illustrated in Fig. 1). In this way, by simultaneously
adjusting the phase shifts of all elements, the IRS can fully control the strength and direction of the
reflected electromagnetic waves, thereby the signal power received at the target devices can be significantly
improved. As a result, IRS has a huge potential to fundamentally change how wireless networks are
designed and pave the wave for future wireless communication systems.
In the literature, the IRS has been extensively investigated to improve the performance of wireless
communication systems [6]-[11]. In [6], the authors proposed to use an IRS to minimize the total transmit
power at the access point (AP) subject to the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) constraints at
the users, for which the active beamforming at the AP and continuous phase shifts at the IRS are jointly
optimized. In [7], the IRS was employed to enhance the system energy efficiency, where the phase shifts
are considered to be discrete for practical implementation. In [8] and [9], the authors proposed the idea
of using IRS to maximize the achievable secrecy rate to protect the system from eavesdropping attacks.
In [10], the IRS was utilized to minimize the transmit power at the base station subject to the secrecy
rate constraint. Different from [8]-[10] those focused on the joint optimization of transmit beamforming
at the base station and reflect beamforming at the IRS, the transmit beamforming with artificial noise
and reflect beamforming were further considered in [11] to enhance the system secrecy rate. It should be
noted that in [6]-[11], only the design of phase shifts was considered and the reflection coefficients were
set to be one directly.
As mentioned above, most of current research works focus on using the IRS to enhance system
performance. However, the deployment of IRS can also cause harmful interference to critical wireless
communications, which has not been addressed effectively yet. To raise a concern about the proper
management of IRS, we introduce an adverse application of IRS in wireless networks, where an IRS
is used as a green jammer to attack the communication between two legitimate devices. Different from
[8]-[11], in which the IRS is used to enhance the secrecy rate at the legitimate receiver (LR), we propose
to use the IRS-based jammer to degrade the SINR at the LR. In addition, different from conventional
active jamming attacks which use their own internal energy to transmit strong noise signals to the victim
system, our proposed IRS-based jammer can use directly the signals of the victim communication system
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Fig. 1. System model.
to attack by changing their reflection coefficients and phase shifts. Consequently, the IRS-based jamming
attacks can interfere the system without leaving any energy footprint, and thus it is very difficult to be
detected and prevented.
In particular, in the system under considerations, once receiving signals transmitted from the legitimate
transmitter (LT), the IRS-based jammer will use directly the LT’s signals to attack the LR. Specifically,
the IRS-based jammer will jointly optimize the magnitudes of reflection coefficients and discrete phase
shifts to minimize the total received signal power at the LR. To address the non-convex problem in jointly
determining the optimal magnitudes of reflection coefficients and phase shifts for the jammer, we adopt the
block coordinate descent (BCD) method to solve two sub-problems iteratively in an alternating manner,
in which the magnitudes of reflection coefficients and phase shifts are optimized respectively. For the first
sub-problem, we first relax the discrete phase shifts to their continuous counterparts, then solve the relaxed
sub-problem by using the semidefinite relaxation (SDR) technique [12] and the Gaussian randomization
method, and finally obtain the solution by quantization. For the second problem, we use the CVX tool
[13] to solve it efficiently. Through simulation results, we show that our proposed IRS-based jammer can
degrade the received signal power at the LR by up to 99%. More interestingly, we show that in some
scenarios, the performance obtained by our proposed IRS-based jammer can be even better than that of
conventional active jamming attacks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a conventional legitimate communication system including an LT and an
LR as illustrated in Fig. 1. The LT is equipped with M antennas, while the LR has a single antenna.
There is an IRS-based jammer located between the LT and LR with the aim to disturb the legitimate
4communication. The IRS is equipped with N passive reflecting elements, each of which is equipped with
adjustable amplitude and phase shift to reflect the incident signals independently [5]. The IRS uses a
micro-controller to perform necessary calculation and control functions, such as channel estimation or
controlling the switching circuit in passive elements to change the amplitude and phase of the reflected
signal. The channels between the LT-LR link, IRS-LR link, and LT-IRS link are denoted by hHd ∈ C1×M ,
hHr ∈ C1×N , and G ∈ CN×M , respectively, where the superscript H represents the conjugate transpose
operation and C denotes the space of a× b complex-valued matrices.
Let Θ = diag(β1e
jθ1, . . . , βNe
jθN ) as the IRS’s diagonal matrix, where βn ∈ [0, 1] and θn ∈ [0, 2pi) are
the magnitude of reflection coefficient and phase shift on the combined incident signal, respectively. For
practical implementation of the IRS [5], [7], we consider that the phase shift for each element can only
be selected from a set of discrete values, which are assumed to be obtained by uniformly quantizing the
interval [0, 2pi) for simplicity [14]. The set of discrete values is then expressed as:
θn ∈ F = {0, 2pi/L, . . . , 2pi(L− 1)/L}, (1)
where L = 2b is the total number of phase shift levels, and b indicates the phase resolution in number
of bits [15]. In this paper, we consider a linear beamforming at the LT with ω ∈ CM×1 denoting the
transmit beamforming vector and satisfying ‖ω‖2 = PT, where PT is the total transmit power at the LT.
In addition, we only consider the signals reflected by the IRS for the first time at the LR, while those
reflected by the IRS two and more times are ignored due to the substantial path-loss [6]. Then, the total
signal received at the LR can be expressed as:
y = (hHr ΘG+ h
H
d )ωs+ z = (h
H
r ΓΘ¯G+ h
H
d )ωs+ z, (2)
where s the information-carrying signal with unit power, z denotes the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at the LR with zero mean and variance σ2, Γ = diag(β1, . . . , βN), and Θ¯ = diag(e
jθ1, . . . , ejθN ).
Accordingly, the received signal power at the LR is given by:
γ = |(hHr ΓΘ¯G+ hHd )ω|2. (3)
5III. RECEIVED SIGNAL POWER MINIMIZATION
A. Problem Formulation
In this paper, we focus on minimizing the received signal power in (3) by jointly optimizing the
magnitudes of reflection coefficients and phase shifts.1 Denote β = [β1, . . . , βN ]
H and θ = [θ1, . . . , θN ]
T,
where the superscript T represents the transpose operation. The corresponding optimization problem can
be formulated as follows:
min
β,θ
|(hHr ΓΘ¯G+ hHd )ω|2,
s.t. 0 ≤ βn ≤ 1, ∀n = {1, . . . , N},
θn ∈ F , ∀n = {1, . . . , N}.
(P1)
Note that the objective function of P1 is non-convex as β and θ are coupled. Moreover, θn is restricted
to be a discrete value. Hence, P1 is a mixed-integer non-linear program (MINLP), which is typically
NP-hard and difficult to solve directly.
B. Proposed Solution
To solve P1 efficiently, we propose an algorithm based on the BCD method to optimize β and θ
alternatively.
1) Phase shift design: Given β, we first design the phase shifts by solving the following problem:
min
θ
|(hHr ΓΘ¯G+ hHd )ω|2,
s.t. θn ∈ F , ∀n = {1, . . . , N}.
(P2)
Note that P2 is still non-convex as its constraints are non-convex. In order to solve P2, we relax the
discrete variables to their continuous counterparts, i.e., 0 ≤ θn ≤ 2pi, ∀n. Then, P2 is recast as follows:
min
θ
|(hHr ΓΘ¯G+ hHd )ω|2,
s.t. 0 ≤ θn ≤ 2pi, ∀n = {1, . . . , N}.
(P2.1)
Let vn = e
jθn and v = [v1, . . . , vN ]
H, where |vn| = 1, ∀n. Denote α = diag(hHr Γ)Gω and ψ = hHdω. Then,
the objective function of P2.1 can be reformulated as |vHα+ ψ|2 = vHααHv + vHαψH + ψαHv + |ψ|2.
1In this paper, we consider the ideal phase shift model for simplicity, i.e., the magnitude of reflection coefficient at each reflecting element
is independent of its phase shift, which was widely used in the literature, e.g., [8]-[11]. In the future work, the practical phase shift model
[16] can be considered to investigate the effect of nonlinear dependence between phase shift and reflection amplitude on the attacking
performance.
6P2.1 is thus equivalent to P2.2, which is given by:
min
v
vHααHv + vHαψH + ψαHv + |ψ|2,
s.t. |vn| = 1, ∀n = {1, . . . , N}.
(P2.2)
Note that P2.2 is still non-convex. To address this issue, an auxiliary matrix Ri and an auxiliary vector
µ are further introduced for substitutions, which are expressed as follows:
R =

αα
H αψH
αHψ 0

 , µ =

v
1

 .
With R and µ, the objective function of P2.2 can be recast by: Tr(RµµH) + |ψ|2. Let V = µµH,
where V  0 and rank(V ) = 1. Then, Tr(RµµH) + |ψ|2 is equivalent to Tr(RV ) + |ψ|2. In addition,
we have a new constraint that Vn,n = 1 due to that |vn| = 1, ∀n, where Vn,n denotes the n-th diagonal
element of V . Hence, P2.2 can be reformulated as:
min
V
Tr(RV ) + |ψ|2,
s.t. Vn,n = 1, ∀n,
V  0,
rank(V ) = 1.
(P2.3)
P2.3 is still a non-convex optimization problem due to the rank-one constraint. However, we can apply
the SDR technique [12] to relax the rank-one constraint. After that, P2.3 is recast as:
min
V
Tr(RV ) + |ψ|2,
s.t. Vn,n = 1, ∀n,
V  0.
(P2.4)
It is obvious that P2.4 is a convex SDP [17] and can be thus solved by the CVX tool [13]. However,
the solution obtained from P2.4 solved by the CVX is generally not a rank-one solution, which leads
to a lower-bound of the received signal power at the LR. Thus, we propose to utilize the Gaussian
randomization method to construct an approximate solution for P2.3 based on the solution from P2.4.
Denote the solution for P2.4 as Vˆ , its singular value decomposition is given by:
Vˆ = UΣUH, (4)
7where U ∈ C(N+1)×(N+1) and Σ ∈ C(N+1)×(N+1) are the unitary matrix and the diagonal matrix of Vˆ ,
respectively. Based on the Gaussian randomization method, a rank-one solution for P2.3 can be constructed
by V¯ = µ¯µ¯H, where
µ¯ = U
√
Σr, (5)
and the random vector r ∈ C(N+1)×1 is independently generated according to CN (0, IN+1). With µ¯, an
approximate solution for P2.1, denoted by θ¯, is recovered by:
θ¯ = − arg
([ µ¯
µ¯(N + 1)
]
(1:N)
)
, (6)
where [w](1:N) indicates the first N elements selected from the vector w, arg(w) denotes the phase of
each element in the vector w, and µ¯(N +1) is the (N +1)-th element of µ¯. Then, we quantize θ¯ to their
nearest discrete values in F defined in (1), which is denoted by θˆ.
Through generating r for a sufficiently large number, we can find the best θˆ among all r’s that minimizes
the received signal power at the LR, which is considered as the sub-optimal solution for P2 with high
accuracy [18]. The algorithm for solving P2 is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The Algorithm for solving P2.
1: Initialize D, which is a sufficiently large number of generating random vectors.
2: Solve P2.4 and obtain Vˆ .
3: Compute the singular value decomposition of Vˆ , and obtain U and Σ.
4: Initialize Γ = ∅.
5: for d = 1, . . . , D do
6: Generate r according to CN (0, IN+1).
7: Construct µ¯ by (5), and obtain θ¯ by (6).
8: Quantize θ¯ to their nearest discrete values in F and obtain θˆ.
9: Compute the objective function value of P2 with θˆ, which is denoted by γd.
10: Γ = Γ ∪ γd.
11: end for
12: Obtain the sub-optimal solution for P2 by θ∗ = argminθˆ Γ.
2) Reflection coefficient design: Given θ, we proceed to design the magnitudes of reflection coefficients
by solving P3, which is given by:
min
β
|(hHr ΓΘ¯G+ hHd )ω|2,
s.t. 0 ≤ βn ≤ 1, ∀n = {1, . . . , N}.
(P3)
8Similarly, P3 can be reformulated as follows:
min
β
|βHc+ ψ|2,
s.t. 0 ≤ βn ≤ 1, ∀n = {1, . . . , N},
(P3.1)
where c = diag(hHr )Θ¯Gω. It is obvious that P3.1 is the convex optimization problem. Hence, we use
the CVX tool to solve it directly.
Based on the above analysis, the algorithm to solve P1 is summarized in Algorithm 2.2 Due to that the
received signal power is always non-increasing after solving P2 and P3.1 sequentially in each iteration,
Algorithm 2 can converge to the given threshold.
Algorithm 2 The Algorithm for solving P1.
1: Initialize: i = 0 and β(0) = [β
(0)
1 , . . . , β
(0)
N ]
H.
2: repeat
3: Solve P2 via Algorithm 1 for the given β(i), and obtain the quantized phase shifts θ∗(i+1).
4: Obtain β(i+1) by solving P3.1 for the given θ∗(i+1).
5: i = i+ 1.
6: until The convergence is achieved.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The simulated network topology is a 2D coordinate system, where the coordinates of the LT, the LR,
and the IRS are given as (xt,0), (xr, 0), (xi, yi), respectively. We follow the channel model considered
in [10]. The small-scale channel coefficients are generated to be circularly complex Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and unit variance. The large-scale path-loss is modeled as A(d/d0)
−α, where A
is the path-loss at the reference distance d0 = 1 m and set to A = −30 dB, d denotes the distance between
two nodes, and α is the path-loss exponent. The path-loss exponents of the LT-LR link, the LT-LRS link,
and the LRS-LR link are set to αLT-LR = 3.5, αLT-IRS = 2.8, and αIRS-LR = 2.8, respectively [6]. Similar as
[10], the setting of other parameters is given as follows unless otherwise stated: PT = 30 dBm, M = 8,
N = 150, b = 5, xt = 0, xr = 10 m, xi = 5 m, and yi = 2 m. The traditional active jamming scheme
with transmit power Pa is used as a benchmark, where the active jammer is deployed at the location of
the IRS. In addition, the scheme without jamming is also used as a benchmark to evaluate the impact of
the IRS jamming attack.
2In Section IV, we sequentially solve P2 and P3.1 for only one time, which can still achieve satisfying performance.
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Fig. 2. SINR versus transmit power of the LT.
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Fig. 3. SINR versus number of reflecting elements.
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed IRS jammer with the conventional active jamming
attack, we first vary the LT’s transmit power and the number of reflecting elements and compare their
performance in terms of SINR. The SINR is determined by:
SINR =
Psignal
Pnoise + Pa
. (7)
In the case of the conventional active jamming attack, Pa is the power of received jamming signals
transmitted by the active jammer, while Pa is set to be zero in the case of IRS jamming attack. The noise
power Pnoise in both cases is set at σ
2 = −60 dBm [10].
In Fig. 2, we vary the LT’s transmit power and show the SINR at the LR under different attacks. It
can be observed that our proposed scheme can degrade the SINR at the LR by about 22 dB compared
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Fig. 4. SINR versus distance between LT and IRS.
to the scheme without jamming. Also, it can be observed that when we increase the transmit power of
the conventional active jammer, the SINR at the LR will be reduced. Here, it is obvious that the active
jamming scheme with high jamming power (e.g., Pa = 35 dBm) can achieve the lowest SINR, i.e., the
best attack performance. However, interestingly, if the active jamming power is not high, i.e., Pa = 15
dBm, our proposed IRS jammer can achieve better attack performance even without using any internal
energy to launch jamming attacks. The reason is that in our proposed scheme, the magnitudes of reflection
coefficients and phase shifts of all passive reflecting elements can be carefully designed such that the total
received signals at the LR from the direct and reflecting links can be added destructively, which can
significantly reduce the received power and thus diminish the SINR at the LR.
In Fig. 3, we show the influence of number of reflecting elements on the SINR. It can be observed
that as the number of reflecting elements increases, the SINR at the LR under the IRS jamming attack
will be significantly reduced due to very low signal power received at the LR. Interesting, if the number
of reflecting elements is sufficiently large, e.g., 200, our proposed IRS jammer can even achieve a better
attack performance than that of the active jamming scheme with Pa = 35 dBm. In addition, we can
conclude that the attack performance of our proposed scheme can be further enhanced with the increase
of reflecting elements, which confirms the superiority of our proposed scheme.
Fig. 4 shows the received SINR versus the distance between the LT and IRS by changing the IRS’s
coordinate, where the distance between the LR and IRS is a constant, i.e., 5 m. From Fig. 4, we can
observe that our proposed scheme can always degrade the received SINR at the LR compared to the scheme
without jamming. As the distance between the LT and IRS increases from 5 m to 12 m, the received
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Fig. 5. SINR versus distance between LR and IRS.
SINR increases. If the distance between the LT and IRS is shorter than 7 m, the attack performance of
our proposed scheme is better than that of the active jamming scheme with Pa = 15 dBm. However,
if the distance between the LT and IRS is larger than the threshold, i.e., 7 m, our proposed scheme
cannot achieve the performance as good as that of the active jamming scheme. The reason is that as the
distance increases, the signal power received at the LR from the reflecting links reduces, which limits the
performance of destructive addition and thus declines the effect of IRS jamming attack.
Fig. 5 investigates the received SINR versus the distance between the LR and IRS by changing the
IRS’s coordinate, where the distance between the LT and IRS is a constant, i.e., 5 m. As the distance
between the LR and IRS increases from 5 m to 12 m, the SINRs at the LR achieved by the proposed
scheme and the active jamming scheme increase. If the distance between the LR and IRS is shorter than 8
m, the attack performance of our proposed scheme is also better than that of the active jamming scheme
with Pa = 15 dBm. In particular, when the distance is 5 m, the attack performance of our proposed
scheme is even close to that of the active jamming scheme with Pa = 35 dBm. If the distance is larger
than the threshold, i.e., 8 m, the attack performance achieved by our proposed scheme is still close to
that of the active jamming scheme with Pa = 15 dBm.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduce a new type of jamming attack, called IRS jamming. Different from all
other wireless jamming attacks in the literature which have to use their own energy to generate jamming
signals, our proposed IRS jammer can leverage directly the LT’s signals to reduce the SINR at the LR.
This is due to the fact that the IRS jammer can control its reflection coefficients and phase shifts to reflect
12
signals which can significantly reduce the received signal power at the LR. Through simulation results,
we show that our proposed IRS jammer can not only remarkably reduce the LR’s SINR, but also achieve
better performance than that of conventional active jamming attack in some scenarios.
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